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German-Israeli Relations Security of Israel -Reason of State?
Israel's security situation characterized by the ongoing failure to advance the peace process, the civil war in Syria as well as in Iraq, the continued threat to existence Merkel clearly declared have been avoided. 4 However, the context of the entire speech leaves no doubt that this applies to any threat to the existence of the state of Israel.
Chancellor Merkel's commitment was in opposition to the public opinion in Germany. Advocacy for the security and for the right of existence of Israel determines German politics. Israel shall live in peace and within secure borders I do not want to think in war scenarios. … and I do not want to think about any scenario that would bring the Chancellor into enormous difficulties, while implementing her statement politically. 6 
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Although he takes Merkel's basic message seriously; he considers her stated policy position to be risky for Germany, since the government cannot implement everything politically as chancellor Merkel's statement is nothing less than a promise of assistance in case of war with Iran. 7 To the German public the scope of this promise, however for the EU and reinforces its influence. 30 However, many observers underestimate the EU's role in the peace effort. The EU in itself is a complex player. On the one hand EU policy must be understood and considered as the sum of the policies of the individual member states of the EU and the proper EU policy. On the other hand, the influence of the EU is sometimes misunderstood by those "thinking of the impact primarily in terms of quasi-hegemonic capacities." 31 German foreign policy tries not to be isolationist. The United Nations General
Assembly ballot on the non-member observer state of Palestine to the UN is a remarkable illustration of this. Initially, Germany, together with UK, wanted to vote against the proposal. Great Britain eventually decided to abstain. Germany followed this vote in order to avoid isolation from major European countries. Therefore it is even more important for Germany to influence the development process of EU policies in line with its own interests. Germany was successful in doing so while ensuring that the EU relations with Israel were increasingly deepened. In 1994, within the framework of the German EU Presidency, a special and privileged status for Israel in relations with the EU was agreed upon. 32 In 2012 the EU called on both the Israelis and the Palestinians to resume direct talks and reiterated its commitment to the two-state solution as well. demonstrate the potential of the Iranian opposition. 73 The fall in oil prices and the current sanctions against Iran present enormous problems for the state budget.
Although Iran has huge oil reserves oil production is declining due to lack of investment; today Iran produces less crude oil than at the times of the Shah. Moreover Iran lacks capacities to refine crude oil. Iran has to import 40% of its demand for gasoline at world prices. In addition very high subsidies on petrol derivatives place a burden on the budget. 74 Socially, the Iranian regime is under considerable pressure as well. Iranians 20 still have relatively free access to foreign media; Iran has the highest internet penetration in the region. Even when looking solely at the internal pressure, the regime faces a tough stance against the West.
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The Iranian nuclear threat worries the overwhelming majority of the Israelis.
Netanyahu declared it his first priority to fight this threat. Israel's time for reaction is running out as Iran could soon harden underground nuclear activities and thus create zones of invulnerability. 52% of all Israelis support a cooperative intervention of Israel and the United States, while only 18% were in favor of unilateral Israeli action. A quarter of Israelis (24%) reject any intervention -whether cooperative or solo. 76 Accordingly, an overwhelming majority of Palestinians (82%) and Israelis (77%) believe that an Israeli military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities would lead to a regional war with Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah. 77 
German-Iranian Bilateral Relations
The diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and Iran were resumed in 1952; after the Islamic revolution in 1979, the relations between the two countries were subject to considerable tensions. Since 2003 German-Iranian relations are marked by the concern over Iran's nuclear program. 78 According to the official statistics on foreigners about 54,000 Iranians live in Germany. 79 The actual number of people of Iranian descent is much higher, at about 120,000, since from 2000 to 2006, 50,000 Iranians applied for German citizenship under the new citizenship law.
The Iranians in Germany have an above average level of education and their societal integration is considered to be particularly successful. 80 In 2011 German exports to Iran have fallen by 19% and imports from Iran to Germany fell by 17%. The bilateral trade volume was 3.9 billion Euros (minus 18%).
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Interestingly, exports to the EU have increased in the same period by 13%. The sharp decline in German exports is primarily due to the sanctions under the UN and EU framework since December 2006. 81 The EU foreign ministers decided in January 2012 on far-reaching sanctions against Iran to increase pressure and to convince Iran to engage in constructive negotiations: e. g. the oil import embargo, central bank listing, and sanctions against the petrochemical industry. German Foreign Minister Guido
Westerwelle stresses that the sanctions work. He cites the inflation in Iran, and the dramatic decrease in oil exports, as evidence. 82 However, the current EU policy does not reach its ultimate goals. So far neither the nuclear dossier nor the human rights issues have changed. The Iranian middle class will be the main losers in all these
processes. This has led to a high degree of frustration and de-politicization. Striving for economic development trumps political development as the first priority. The nature of internal competition changed from ideological-revolutionary to more pragmaticeconomic. The greater competition for economic interests may shift the balance of power in the long run and it may lead to a scenario where economic interest groups will push for a moderation in politics to safeguard their interests. 84 However, a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities would most probably be counterproductive. The nuclear program would only be slowed down, but not eliminated permanently. In fact, an attack would strengthen Iran's perception that the nuclear program is necessary as a means of deterrence and self-defense. 85 German Policy Options
Even though the Iranian leadership has misjudged German motives and interests in the nuclear dispute in the past, Germany can make use of the relatively high level of trust that it enjoys to continue to contribute ideas for a constructive solution. In particular, opening up of new suggestions in the field of energy partnership and regional security could help considerably. 86 Due to limited resources and political will Germany cannot act unilaterally. Germany has to strive for political solutions within the framework of the E3 + 3.
Negotiations must be aimed at preventing Iran's nuclear weapons. Still Iran's basic security interests have to be acknowledged. Objectively, Iran is a de facto regional power whether this corresponds to the wishes of Western politicians or not. Therefore, the topic of regional security has to be put on the table in connection with the nuclear should not be underestimated in a state which gains its internal legitimization through a religious form of government. 89 In order to defuse the conflict, one side must take the first step towards deescalation -and make concessions. The U.S. can reach out to Tehran, without changing its security threat. The United States could deal with a nuclear armed Iran.
Conversely, the United States is the greatest perceived threat to the regime in Tehran. The German government has several options. First, to put even more pressure on Iran to promote a diplomatic solution to the nuclear dispute. This is already happening -and soon it will be more powerful, as the stricter oil sanctions against Iran 26 Paragraph 6 of the German War Weapons Control Act (Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz) prohibits the supply of arms to other States, if there is a risk that these weapons will be used in a peace-disturbing activity, especially in a war of aggression. This provision is often understood to mean that the supply of weapons to conflict areas is forbidden. However, this is not covered by the wording of the law. Germany actually delivers weapons to Israel and Saudi Arabia thus in a crisis region. 27 In German: 'militärpolitischen'. 28 Outstanding examples of armaments cooperation are the Israeli Heron UAV, the Dolphinclass submarines, and the loan of Patriot systems to Israel.
